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In Contemplation of Death
Hendrick Machoian *
T HE PHRASE "IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH" is used in connec-
tion with gifts in federal estate tax law' and in connection
with gifts causa mortis at common law. 2 The purpose of this
paper is to determine the difference, if any, between the scope of
the phrase for federal estate tax purposes and the scope of the
phrase for purposes of gifts causa mortis.
The gift causa mortis "goes back to a very early period. It
was brought to England as part of the Roman or civil law, and
seems to have been recognized by the Greeks before it was known
to the Romans. This country adopted it as part of the common
law of England." 3
A gift causa mortis means a gift in contemplation of the
donor's death,4 and may be defined as a gift of personal property
made in the prospect of the donor's death and upon condition that
the property shall belong completely to the donee in the event
that the donor dies as anticipated, leaving the donee surviving
him, and the gift is not in the meantime revoked.5
From the above definition, it is clear that a vital and neces-
sary element of a gift causa mortis is that the transfer be made
in contemplation of death. But does the phrase in such context
have reference to the general expectation or apprehension of
death which all persons entertain or does it have reference to
some other concern? It is well settled at common law that the
contemplation of death necessary to constitute a gift causa mortis
must arise from an expectation of imminent death from disease
or peril impending at the time of the gift.6 In other words, a gift
causa mortis is one made in the concerned approach of death, not
general apprehension of death, but an apprehension arising from
a peculiar sickness, peril or danger-that is, in anticipation of
impending death.
*Student, Washington College of Law, American University.
1 Sec. 2035, 1954 I. R. C.
2 Streeper v. Myers, 132 Ohio St. 322, 7 N. E. 2d 554 (1937); Levas v.
Dewey, 33 Wash. 2d 232, 205 P. 2d 356 (1949).
3 Trout v. Farmers' Trust Co. of Newark, 19 Del. Ch. 437, 168 A. 208, 210
(1933).
4 Adcock v. Bishop, 309 Ky. 502, 218 S. W. 2d 52, 53 (1949).
5 Foster v. Reiss, 31 N. J. Super. 496, 107 A. 2d 24, 26 (1954).
0 See 24 Am. Jur., Gifts, Sec. 6, n. 12, for cases so holding.
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The phrase "in contemplation of death" now used in statutes
was no doubt borrowed from the common law gift causa mortis.
The phrase first appeared in the New York Inheritance Tax Law
of 1891,7 and was early held to apply to gifts causa mortis." The
phrase soon found its way into the inheritance tax statutes of
other states; and by the time the first federal estate tax law was
enacted, state courts (including New York) were generally hold-
ing that the phrase was not restricted to gifts causa mortis.9
The phrase was first used by the Congress in the Revenue
Act of 1916, imposing an estate tax. 10 The phrase was continued
in every subsequent Revenue Act, and later in Sections 811 (c)
(1) (A) and 811 (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and
then in Section 2035 of the 1954 Code. The phrase is used to cre-
ate a statutory presumption of includibility of gifts in the gross
estate of a decedent, unless shown to the contrary, where such
gifts are made within three years before his death, except to the
extent that the transfer was made for a full and adequate con-
sideration in money or money's worth.'1
7 New York Laws, 1891, c. 215, Sec. 1 (Mertens' Law of Federal Gift and
Estate Taxation, Vol. 3, Sec. 22.01, n. 1, states, without a supporting refer-
ence, that the phrase first appeared on the American scene in a Maryland
statute of 1844.)
8 Matter of Seaman, 147 N. Y. 69, 41 N. E. 401 (1895).
9 Annotations, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 458 (1909), 46 Ibid. 790 (1913), 7 A. L. R.
1028, 1030 (1920).
10 Sec. 202 (b), Revenue Act of 1916. Infra, 283 U. S. at 114, note 12.
11 Since the inception of the federal estate tax in 1916, property transferred
by a decedent in contemplation of death has been includible in his gross
estate. The 1916 act subdivided transfers in contemplation of death into
two classifications: (1) transfers made at anytime could be in contempla-
tion of death, and (2) transfers of a material part of the transferor's prop-
erty within two years of his death were presumed to have been made in
contemplation of death.
In 1926 Congress made the two-year presumption conclusive (Section
302 (c), Revenue Act of 1926), but in Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, 52
S. Ct. 358 (1932), the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the
provision as written was unconstitutional, being violative of the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Throughout the period 1916-50, transfers made outside the presumptive
period could be included in the gross estate if, without recourse to the
presumption, they were made in contemplation of death. In 1950, however,
the final clause of what is now Section 2035 (b) was enacted, providing
that gifts made more than three years before death may not be included
in the gross estate as gifts in contemplation of death. At the same time
the language of the rebuttable presumption was given in its present form,
and the period to which it applies was extended from two to three years
(Sec. 502, Revenue Act of 1950). These amendments are incorporated into
the 1954 Code, which provides at the present time as follows:
(Continued on next page)
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The question of whether the scope of the phrase "in contem-
plation of death" for federal estate tax purposes was restricted
to its scope in gifts causa mortis was decided in 1931 by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in the case of United States v.
Wells,12 which involved a gift under the Revenue Act of 1918.
In that case the Government was contesting a decision of the
Court of Claims which had held that "'contemplation of death'
does not mean that general knowledge of all men that they must
die, but there must be a present apprehension, from some exist-
ing bodily or mental condition or impending peril, creating a
reasonable fear that death is near at hand, and that such reason-
able fear or apprehension must be the direct or animating cause,
and the only cause of the transfer." 13
It is apparent that the Court of Claims was restricting the
meaning of the phrase "in contemplation of death" to its defini-
tion in gifts causa mortis. The Government argued that such
definition was too narrow; that transfers in contemplation of
death are not limited to those induced by a condition causing
expectation of death in the near future; that the character of
such gifts is determined by the state of mind of the donor at the
time they are made, and that the statutory presumption may be
overcome only by proof that the decedent's purpose in making the
gift was to attain some object desirable to him during his life, as
distinguished from the distribution of his estate as at death. Al-
though the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Claims on
other grounds, it agreed that "the Government [was] right in
its criticism of the narrowness of the rule laid down by the Court
(Continued from preceding page)
Section 2035. Transaction in Contemplation of Death.
(a) General Rule.-The value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property (except real property situated outside of the
United States) to the extent of any interest therein of which the dece-
dent has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide
sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth), by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of his death.
(b) Application of General Rule.-If the decedent within a period
of 3 years ending with the date of his death (except in case of a bona
fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth) transferred an interest in property . . .such transfer ... shall,
unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in con-
templation of death . . .; but no such transfer .... made before such
3-year period shall be treated as having been made in contemplation
of death.
12 283 U. S. 102, 51 S. Ct. 446, 75 L. Ed. 867 (1931).
13 69 Ct. Cl. 485, 39 F. 2d 998 1009 (1930).
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of Claims, in requiring that there be a condition 'creating a
reasonable fear that death is near at hand,' and that 'such reason-
able fear or apprehension' must be 'the only cause of the trans-
fer.' " 14
The Court also said:
The words 'in contemplation of death' mean that the thought
of death is the impelling cause of the transfer, and while the
belief in the imminence of death may afford the convincing
evidence, the statute is not to be limited, and its purpose
thwarted, by a rule of construction which in place of con-
templation of death makes the final criterion to be an ap-
prehension that death is 'near at hand.'
If it is the thought of death, as a controlling motive prompting
the disposition of property, that affords the test, it follows
that the statute does not embrace gifts inter vivos which
spring from a different motive.15 [Italics supplied.]
The Court was speaking of motives associated with death.
But after describing several possible living motives, the Court
went on to say, ". . . the gratification of such desires [living
motives] may be a more compelling motive than any thought of
death." And further, the Court said, ". . . There is no escape
from the necessity of carefully scrutinizing the circumstances of
each case to detect the dominant motive of the donor in the light
of his bodily and mental condition. . ." Still further, the Court
said, ". . . It is sufficient if contemplation of death be the in-
ducing cause of the transfer whether or not death is believed to
be near. .." 16 (Italics supplied.)
As can be seen, the Supreme Court did not adhere to one
definition. It directed a finding to:
1. the impelling cause,
2. the controlling motive,
3. the compelling motive,
4. the dominant motive,
5. the inducing cause.
In most transfer cases, more than one motive contributed to
the decedent's decision to make the transfer. That is, the de-
cedent could have had mixed motives-motives associated with
life, and motives associated with death. How are the various
14 283 U. S. at 119.
15 Id. at 118.
16 Id. at 118, 119.
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motives weighed? The present regulations define a transfer in
contemplation of death as one "prompted by the thought of
death." 17 The regulations point out that it need not be solely so
prompted; 18 but "a transfer is prompted by the thought of death
if (1) made with the purpose of avoiding death taxes, (2) made
as a substitute for a testamentary disposition of the property, or
(3) made for any other motive associated with death." 19
Thus, the present regulation definition of "in contemplation
of death" means that if the transfer would not have been made
solely by reason of a living motive the additional death motive
must have prompted the transfer. In other words, the position
taken in the regulations is that decedent's motives must be shown
to have been associated with life and that there will be no weigh-
ing of motives.
This test appears to be much stricter than the test set out
by the Supreme Court in the Wells case, supra, which appears to
have established the "dominant motive" test where mixed mo-
tives are involved in a transfer.2 0 These different definitions no
doubt account for the fact that so many contemplation-of-death
cases go to court, and for the further fact that the Government
wins only 34 percent of these cases.2 1
In spite of the difference between the definition laid down
by the Supreme Court and that set out by the regulations, it is
quite clear that the phrase "in contemplation of death" in Sec-
tion 2035 does not refer to the general expectation of death which
all men entertain, nor is its meaning confined to such an ex-
pectancy of death as is required in a gift causa mortis. The dif-
ferentiating factor between the scope of the phrase in gifts causa
17 26 C. F. R. Sec. 20.2035-1 (c) (1954).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 After the Supreme Court decision in the Wells case, (supra, note 12)
the regulations adopted the test that "if the transfer results from mixed
motives, one of which is the thought of death, the more compelling motive
controls." (Art. 16 of Regulations 80) This test appeared to adopt the
"dominant motive" test. Viewing the Treasury interpretation of the Wells
case, the courts decided many cases against the Government by finding a
dominant living motive, e.g. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 98 F. 2d
794 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. den. 306 U. S. 648. That case was followed (in
1940) by an amendment to the regulations eliminating the language that
the compelling motive controls where there are mixed motives. The defini-
tion of a gift in contemplation of death was given its present form by that
amendment.
21 Atlas, Gifts in Contemplation of Death, 23 Taxes 421 (1945).
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mortis and in transfers under Section 2035 must be found in the
transferor's motive when he made the particular transfer. The
question of motive is essentially one of fact and is difficult to
ascertain, especially where the subject is dead. For these reasons,
the courts have not been effective in delimiting the precise scope
of the phrase for purposes of Section 2035. Each case must be
examined and decided in the light of all the surrounding circum-
stances. But it may be generally said that the phrase "in con-
templation of death" in Section 2035 is satisfied where for any
reason the decedent becomes concerned about what will happen
to his property at his death and as a result takes action to control
or in some way affect its devolution.
In conclusion, it may be said that the scope of the phrase "in
contemplation of death" for purposes of gifts causa mortis has
reference to an expectation of imminent death from disease or
peril impending at the time of the gift, and not to the general
apprehension of death which all men entertain. On the other
hand, the scope of the phrase for federal estate tax purposes is
not restricted to its meaning in gifts causa mortis, nor does it
have reference to the general apprehension of death which all
men entertain. The precise scope of the phrase, though broader
than in gifts causa mortis, is to be found in each case by looking
into the state of mind of the decedent and finding his motive
when he made a particular transfer of property.
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